What makes people smarter than machines? They certainly are not quicker or more precise. Yet people are far better at perceiving objects in natural scenes and noting their relations , at understanding language and retrieving contextually appropriate information from memory, at making plans and carrying out contextually appropriate actions, and at a wide range of other natural cognitive .tasks. People are also far better at learning to do these things more accurately and fluently through processing experience.
and retrieving contextually appropriate information from memory, at making plans and carrying out contextually appropriate actions, and at a wide range of other natural cognitive .tasks. People are also far better at learning to do these things more accurately and fluently through processing experience.
What is the basis for these differences? One answer, perhaps the classic one we might expect from artificial intelligence, is " software." If we only had the right computer program, the argument goes , we might be able to capture the fluidity and adaptability of human information proceSSIng.
Certainly this answer is partially correct. There have been great breakthroughs in our understanding of cognition as a result of the development of expressive high-level computer languages and powerful algorithms. No doubt there will be more such breakthroughs in the future. However , we do not think that software is the whole story.
In our view, people are smarter than today s computers because the brain employs a basic computational architecture that is more suited to deal with a central aspect of the natural information processing tasks that people are so good at. In this chapter, we will show through examples that these tasks generally require the simultaneous consideration of many pieces of information or constraints. Each constraint may be imperfectly specified and ambiguous, yet each can playa potentially decisive role in determining the outcome of processing. After examining these points , we will introduce a computational framework for modeling cognitive processes that seems well suited to exploiting these constaints and that seems closer than other frameworks to the style of computation as it might be done by the brain. We will review several early examples of models developed in this framework, and we will ! show that the mechanisms these models employ can give rise to power-\ ful emergent properties that begin to suggest attractive alternatives to ! traditional accounts of various aspects of cognition. We will also show that models of this class provide a basis for understanding how learning \ can occur spontaneously, as a by-product of processing activity.
Multiple Simultaneous Constraints
Reaching and grasping.
Hundreds of times each day we reach for things. We nearly never think about these acts of reaching. And yet each time , a large number of different considerations appear to jointly determine exactly how we will reach for the object. The position of the object , our posture at the time , what else we may also be holding, the size , shape, and anticipated weight of the object , any obstacles that may be in the way-all of these factors jointly determine the exact method we will use for reaching and grasping.
Consider the situation shown in On the desk next to my terminal are several objects-a chipped coffee mug, the end of a computer cable, a knob from a clock radio. I decide to pick the knob up. At first I hesitate, because it doesn t seem possible. Then I just reach for it, and find myself grasping the knob in what would normally be considered a very awkward position-but it solves all of the constraints. I'm not sure what all the details of the movement were, so I let myself try it a few times more. I observe that my right hand is carried up off the keyboard , bent at the elbow, until forearm is at about a 300 angle to the desk top and parallel to the side of the terminal. The palm is facing downward through most of this. Then, my arm extends and lowers down more or less parallel to the edge of the desk and parallel to the side of the terminal and, as it drops , it turns about 900 so that the A: An everyday situation in which it is necessary to take into account a large number of constraints to grasp a desired object. In this case the target object is the small knob to the left of the cup. B: The posture the arm arrives at in meeting these constraints.
palm is facing the cup and the thumb and index finger are below. The turning motion occurs just in time , as my hand drops , to avoid hitting the coffee cup. My index finger and thumb close in on the knob and grasp it , with my hand completely upside down.
Though the details of what happened here might be quibbled with the broad outlines are apparent. The shape of the knob and its position on the table; the starting position of the hand on the keyboard; the positions of the terminal , the cup, and the knob; and the constraints imposed by the structure of the arm and the musculature used to control it-all these things conspired to lead to a solution which exactly suits the problem. If any of these constraints had not been included the movement would have failed. The hand would have hit the cup or the terminal-or it would have missed the knob.
The mutual influence of syntax and semantics.
Multiple constraints
operate just as strongly in language processing as they do in reaching and grasping. ' Rumelhart (1977) has documented many of these multiple constraints. Rather than catalog them here, we will use a few examples from language to illustrate the fact that the constraints tend to be reciprocal: The example shows that they do not run only from syntax to semantics-they also run the other way.
It is clear , of course , that syntax constrains the assignment of meaning. Without the syntactic rules of English to guide us , we cannot correctly understand who has done what to whom in the following sentence:
The boy the man chased kissed the girl.
But consider these examples (Rumelhart , 1977; Schank, 1973): I saw the grand canyon flying to New York. I saw the sheep grazing in the field.
Our knowledge of syntactic rules alone does not tell us what grammatical role is played by the prepositional phrases in these two cases. In the first flying to New York" is taken as describing the context in which the speaker saw the Grand Canyon-while he was flying to New York.
In the second grazing in the field" could syntactically describe an analogous situation , in which the speaker is grazing in the field , but this possibility does not typically become available on first reading. Instead we assign grazing in the field n as a modifier of the sheep (roughly, who were grazing in the field" ). The syntactic structure of each of I like the joke. I like the drive. I like to joke. I like to drive.
In this case it .looks as though the words the and to serve to determine whether the following word will be read as a noun or a verb. This , of course , is a very strong constraint in English and can serve to force a verb interpretation of a word that is not ordinarily used this way:
I like to mud.
On the other hand, if the information specifying whether the function word preceding the final word is to or the is ambiguous, then the typical reading of the word that follows it will determine which way the function word is heard. This was shown in an experiment by Isenberg, Walker, Ryder, and Schweikert (1980) . They presented sounds halfway between to (actually If!) and the (actually IdA!) and found that words like joke which we tend to think of first as nouns , made subjects hear the marginal stimuli as the while words like drive which we tend to think of first as verbs , made subjects hear the marginal stimuli as to.
Generally, then , it would appear that each word can help constrain the syntactic role , and even the identity, of every other word.
Simultaneous mutual constraints in word recognition.
Just as the syntactic role of one word can influence the role assigned to another in analyzing sentences , so the identity of one letter can influence the identity assigned to another in reading. A famous example of this , from
Selfridge, is shown in Figure 2 . Along with this is a second example in which none of the letters, considered separately, can be identified information leaves open for each so constrain the possible identities of the others that we are capable of identifying all of them.
At first glance , the situation here must seem paradoxical: The identity of each letter is constrained by the identities of each of the others. But since in general we cannot know the identities of any of the letters until we have established the identities of the others, how can we get the process started?
The resolution of the paradox , of course , is simple. One of the different possible letters in each position fits together with the others. It appears then that our perceptual system is capable of exploring all these possibilities without committing itself to one until all of the constraints are taken into account. Representations like scripts, frames , and schemata are useful structures for encoding knowledge, although we believe they only approximate the underlying structure of knowledge representation that emerges from the class of models we consider in this book, as explained in Chapter 14. Our main point here is that any theory that tries to account for human knowledge using script-like knowledge structures will have to allow them to interact with each other to capture the generative capacity of human understanding in novel situations. Achieving such interactions has been one of the greatest difficulties associated with implementing models that really think generatively using script-or frame-like representations. One reason for the appeal of PDP models is their obvious " physiological" flavor: They seem so much more closely tied to the physiology of the brain than are other kinds of information-processing models. The brain consists of a large number of highly interconnected elements (Figure 3 ) which apparently send very simple excitatory and inhibitory messages to each other and update their excitations on the basis of these simple messages. The properties of the units in many of the PDP models we will be exploring were inspired by basic properties of the neural hardware. In a later section of this book, we wilI examine in some detail the relation between PDP models and the brain. Though the appeal of POP models is definitely enhanced by their physiological plausibility and neural inspiration , these are not the primary bases for their appeal to us. We are , after all , cognitive scientists and POP models appeal to us for psychological and computational reasons. They hold out the hope of offering computationally sufficient and psychologically accurate mechanistic accounts of the phenomena of human cognition which have eluded successful explication in conventional computational formalisms; and they have radically altered the way we think about the time-course of processing, the nature of representation , and the mechanisms of learning. The development of PDP models is still in its infancy. Thus far the models which have been proposed capture simplified versions of the kinds of phenomena we have been describing rather than the full elaboration that these phenomena display in real settings. But we think there have been enough steps forward in recent years to warrant a concertedeffort at describing where the approach has gotten and where it is going now, and to point out some directions for the future.
The first section of the book represents an introductory course in parallel di stributed processing. The rest of this chapter attempts to describe in informal terms a number of the models which have been proposed in previous work and to show that the approach is indeed a fruitful one. It also contains a brief description of the major sources of the inspiration we have obtained from the work of other researchers.
This chapter is Jollowed , in Chapter 2 , by a description of the quantitative framework within which these models can be described and examined. , Ch~ptet l explicates one of the central concepts of the book: In the second case , the hand as a whole moves up, bringing the middle finger over the and the index finger over the r.
Thus , we can see that several letters can simultaneously influence the positioning of the fingers and the hands.
From the point of view of optimizing the efficiency of the typing motion , these different patterns seem very sensible. In the first case the hand as a whole is maintained in a good compromise position to allow the typist to strike both letters reasonably efficiently by extending the fingers up or down. In the second case , the need to extend the fingers is reduced by moving the whole hand up, putting it in a nearoptimal position to strike either key. (1982) have simulated these effects using PDP mechanisms. Figure 4 illustrates aspects of the model as they are illustrated in typing the word very. In brief, Rumelhart and Norman assumed that the decision to type a word caused activation of a unit for that word. That unit , in turn, activated units corresponding to each of the letters in the word. The unit for the first letter to be typed was made to inhibit the units for the second and following letters , the unit
Rumelhart and Norman
for the second to inhibit the third and following letters, and so on.
a result of the interplay of activation and inhibition among these units the unit for the first letter was at first the most strongly active, and the units for the other letters were partially activated.
Each letter unit exerts influences on the hand and finger involved in typing the letter. The unit , for example , tends to cause the index finger to move down and to cause the whole hand to move down with it. The unit, on the other hand, tends to cause the middle finger on the left hand to move up and to cause the whole hand to move up also. The extent of the influences of each letter on the hand and finger it directs depends on the extent of the activation of the letter. Therefore at first , in typing the word very, the exerts the greatest control.
; ii: :::; i!:
Keypress Schemata Because the and are simultaneously pulling the hand up, though , the is typed primarily by moving the index finger, and there is little movement on the whole hand.
Once a finger is within a certain striking distance of the key to typed , the actual pressing movement is triggered , and the keypress occurs. The keypress itself causes a strong inhibitory signal to be sent to the unit for the letter just typed , thereby removing this unit from the picture and allowing the unit for the next letter in the word to become the most strongly acti vated.
This mechanism provides a simple way for all of the letters to jointly determine the successive configurations the hand will enter into in the process of typing a word. This model has shown considerable success predicting the time between successive keystrokes as a function of the different keys involved. Given a little noise in the activation process, it can also account for some of the different kinds of errors that have been observed in transcription typing. The typing . model represents an illustration of the fact that serial behavior-a succession of key stroke iS not necessarily the result of an inherently serial processing mechanism. In this model , the sequential structure of typing emerges from the interaction of the excitatory and inhibitory influences among the processing units.
Reaching for an object without falling over.
Similar mechanisms
can be used to model the process of reaching for an object without losing one s balance while standing, as Hinton (1984) has shown. He considered a simple version of this task using a two-dimensional" person with a foot , a lower leg, an upper leg, a trunk , an upper arm, and a lower arm. Each of these limbs is joined to the next at a joint which has a single degree of rotational freedom. The task posed to this person is to reach a target placed somewhere in front of it , without taking any steps and without falling down. This is a simplified version of the situation in which a real person has to reach out in front for an object placed somewhere in the plane that vertically bisects the body. The task is not as simple as it looks, since if we just swing an arm out in front of ourselves, it may shift our center of gravity so far forward that we will lose our balance. The problem , then, is to find a set of joint angles that simultaneously solves the two constraints on the task. First the tip of the forearm must touch the object. Second, to keep from falling down , the person must keep its center of gravity over the foot.
To do this , Hinton 'assigned a single processor to each joint. On each computational cycle , each processor received information about how far the tip of the hand was from the target and where the center of gravity was with respect to the foot. Using these two pieces of information each joint adjusted its angle so as to approach the goals of maintaining balance and bringing the tip closer to the target. After a number of iterations , the stick-person settled on postures that satisfied the goal of reaching the target and the goal of maintaining the center of gravity over the " feet."
Though the simulation was able to perform the task , eventually satisfying both goals at once , it had a number of inadequacies stemming from the fact that each joint processor attempted to achieve a solution in ignorance of what the other joints were attempting to do. This problem was overcome by using additional processors responsible for setting combinations of joint angles. Thus , a processor for flexion and extension of the leg would adjust the knee , hip, and ankle joints synergistically, while a processor for flexion and extension of the arm would adjust the shoulder and elbow together. With the addition of processors of this form, the number of iterations required to reach a solution was greatly reduced, and the form of the approach to the solution looked very natural. The sequence of configurations attained in one processing run is shown in Figure 5 .
Explicit attempts to program a robot to cope with the problem of maintaining balance as it reaches for a desired target have revealed the difficulty of deriving explicitly the right combinations of actions for each possible starting state and goal state. This simple model illustrates that we may be wrong to seek such an explicit solution. We see here that a solution to the problem can emerge from the action of a number of simple processors each attempting to honor the constraints independently.
FIGURE 5. A sequence of configurations assumed by the stick " person" performing the reaching task described in the text , from Hinton (1984) . The small circle represents the center of gravity of the whole stick-figure , and the cross represents the goal to be reached. The configuration is shown on every second iteration.
One early model using parallel distributed processing was the model of stereoscopic depth perception proposed by Marr and Poggio (I 976) . Their theory proposed to explain the percep-.
tion of depth in random-dot stereograms ( Figure 6 ) in terms of a simple distributed processing mechanism.
Random-dot stereograms present interesting c~allenges to mechanisms of depth perception. A stereogram consists of two random-dot patterns. In a simple stereogram such as the one shown here, one pattern is an exact copy of the other except that the pattern of dots in a region of one of the patterns is shifted horizontally with respect to the rest of the pattern. Each of the two patterns-corresponding to two retinal images-consists entirely of a pattern of random dots, so there is no information in either of the two views considered alone that can indicate the presence of different surfaces, let alone depth relations among those surfaces. Yet , when one of these dot patterns is projected to the left eye and th-e other to the right eye , an observer sees each region as a surface , with the shifted region hovering in front of or behind the other, depending on the direction of the shift.
FIGURE 6. Random-dot stereo grams. The two patterns are identical except that the pattern of dots in the central region of the left pattern are shifted over with respect to those in the right. When viewed stereoscopically such that the left pattern projects to the left eye and the right pattern to the right eye, the shifted area appears to hover above the page. Some readers may be able to achieve this by converging to a distant point (e. , a Reprinted by permission.)
What kind of a mechanism might we propose to account for these facts? Marr and Poggio (I976) began by explicitly representing the two views in two arrays , as human observers might in two different retinal images. They noted that corresponding black dots at different perceived distances from the observer will be offset from each other by different amounts in the two views. The job of the model is to determine which points correspond. This task is, of course , made difficult by the fact that there will be a very large number of spurious correspondences of individual dots. The goal of the mechanism, then is to find those correspondences that represent real correspondences in depth and suppress those that represent spurious correspondences.
To carry out this task, Marr and Poggio assigned a processing unit to each possible conjunction of a point in one image and a point in the other. Since the eyes are offset horizontally, the possible conjunctions occur at various offsets or disparities along the horizontal dimension.
Thus , for each point in one eye , there was a set of processing units with one unit assigned to the conjunction of that point and the point at each horizontal offset from it in the other eye.
Each processing unit received activation whenever both of the points the unit stood for contained dots. So far, then , units for both real and spurious correspondences would be equally activated. To allow the mechanism to find the right correspondences , they pointed out two general principles about the visual world: (a) Each point in each view generally corresponds to one and only one point in the other view, and (b) neighboring points in space tend to be at nearly the same depth and therefore at about the same disparity in the two images. While there are discontinuities at the edges of things , over most of a twodimensional view of the world there will be continuity. These principles are called the uniqueness and continuity constraints , respectively.
Marr and Poggio incorporated these principles into the interconnections between the processing units. The uniqueness constraint was captured by inhibitory connections among the units that stand for alternative correspondences of the same dot. The continuity principle was captured by excitatory connections among the units that stand for similar offsets of adjacent dots.
These additional connections allow the Marr and Poggio model to solve" stereograms like the one shown in the figure. At first, when a pair of patterns is presented, the units for all possible correspondences of a dot in one eye with a dot in the other will be equally excited. However, the excitatory connections cause the units for the correct conjunctions to receive more excitation than units for spurious conjunctions , and the inhibitory connections allow the units for the correct conjunctions to turn off the units for the spurious connections. Thus the model tends to settle down into a stable state in which only the correct correspondence of each dot remains active.
There are a number of reasons why Marr and Poggio (1979) modified this model (see Marr, 1982 , for a discussion), but the basic mechanisms of mutual excitation between units that are mutually consistent and mutual inhibition between units that are mutually incompatible provide a natural mechanism for settling on the right conjunctions of points and rejecting spurious ones. The model also illustrates how general principles or rules such as the uniqueness and continuity principles may be embodied in the connections between processing units , and how behavior in accordance with these principles can emerge from the interactions determined by the pattern of these interconnections.
Perceptual completion of familiar patterns.
Perception , of course , is influenced by familiarity. It is a well-known fact that we often misperceive unfamiliar objects as more familiar ones and that we can get by with less time or with lower-quality information in perceiving familiar items than we need for perceiving unfamiliar items. Not only does familiarity help us determine what the higher-level structures are when the lower-level information is ambiguous; it also allows us to fill in missing lower-level information within familiar higher-order patterns. The well-known phonemic restoration effect is a case in point. In this phenomenon , perceivers hear sounds that have been cut out of words as if they had actually been present. For example, Warren (1970) presented legi#lature to subjects , with a click in the location marked by the #. Not only did subjectscorrectIy identify the word legislature;
they also heard the missing sl just as though it had been presented.
They had great difficulty , lo~alit:ing toe click, which they tended to hear as a disembodied sound. Similar phenomena have been observed in visual perception of wordssince the work of Pillsbury (1897). Two of us have proPased a tnodel describing the role of familiarity in perception based onexcita.tQry ap:(:tinhibitory interactions among units standing for variousqypgtpeses about the input at different levels of abstraction (McCleUand&' (u.melhart , 1981; Rumelhart & McClelland 1982) . The model ' haS';~een.:~p plied ' in detail ' to ' the role of familiarity in the perception of letters in visually presented, words, and has proved to provide a verycloseaccdunr of the results of a large number of experiments. '
The model assumes that there are units that act as detectors for the visual features whicl1~distlQgliish letters; with one set of units assigned to detect the feaiun~siri eacliofthe different letter-positions in the word. For four-letter words, then, there are four such sets of detectors. There are also four sets of detectors for the letters themselves and a set of detectors for the words. The set of excitatory and inhibitory interactions between units can be diagrammed by drawing excitaroryand inhibitory links between them. The whole picture is toocOn1ple~Jodraw, sowe illustrate only with a fragment: Some of thein.te~a~~~6'n~1:Ietween some of the units in this model are illustrated inFig4re.7"' ;;~i
Let us consider what , h'ip~eI1s~: r~\:ii'~Yst~(lj)lke this when a familiar " " ., " " , stimulus is presentedund~i(' rag~g(Qoodjiions. For example consider the display shoWn In. One way of accounting for such performances is to imagine that the perceiver possesses , in addition to detectors for familiar words, sets of .
detectors for regular subword units such as familiar letter clusters , or that they use abstract rules , specifying which classes of letters can go with which others in different contexts. It turns out , however, that the model we have already described needs no such additional structure to produce perceptual facilitation for word-like letter strings; to this extent it acts as if it " knows " the orthographic structure of English. We illustrate this feature of the model with the example shown in Figure 9 , While they compete with each other , none of these words gets strongly enough activated to completely suppress all the others. Instead , these units act as a group to reinforce particularly the letters and A.
There are no close partial matches which include the letter in the second position , so this letter receives no feedback support. As a result comes to dominate , and eventually suppress , the in the second position.
The fact that the word perception model exhibits perceptual facilitation to pronounceable nonwords as well as words illustrates once again how behavior in accordance with general principles or rules can emerge from the interactions of simple processing elements. Of course , the behavior of the word perception model does not implement exactly any of the systems of orthographic rules that have been proposed by linguists (Chomsky & Halle , 1968; Venesky, 1970) or psychologists (Spoehr &. Smith , 1975) . In this regard , it only approximates such rule-based descriptions of perceptual processing. However, rule systems such as Chomsky and Halle s or Venesky s appear to be only. approximately honored in human performance as well (Smith & Baker 1976) . Indeed , some of the discrepancies between human performance data and rule systems occur in exactly the ways that we would predict from the word perception model (Rumelhart & McClelland , 1982) .
This illustrates the possibility that PDP models may provide more accurate accounts of the details of human performance than models 
5W
;0' FIGURE 9. An example of a non word display that might be presented to the interactive activation model of word recognition and the response of selected units at the letter and word levels. The letter units illustrated are detectors for letters in the second input position.
based on a set of rules representing human competence-at least in some domains.
Retrieving Information From Memory

Content addressability.
One very prominent feature of human memory is that it is content addressable.
It seems fairly clear that we , -""' , " """-""~, ,,," , -.l THE POP PERSPECTIVE can access information in memory based on nearly any attribute of the representation we are trying to retrieve.
Of course , some cues are much better than others. An attribute which is shared by a very large number of things we know about is not a very effective retrieval cue , since it does not accurately pick out a particular memory representation. But , several such cues , in conjunction can do the job. Thus , if we ask ' a friend who goes out with several women , "
Who was that woman I saw you with?" , he may not know which one we mean-but if we specify something else about her-say the color of her hair , what she was wearing (in so far as he remembers this at all), where we saw him with her-he will likely be able to hit upon the right one.
It is , of course , possible to implement some kind of content addressability of memory on a standard computer in a variety of different ways. One way is to search sequentially, examining each memory in the system to find the memory or the set of memories which has the. particular content specified in the cue. An alternative somewhat more efjlcient , scheme involves some form of indexingkeeping a list , for every content a memory might have , of which memories have that content.
Such an indexing scheme can be made to work with error-free probes , but it will break dowhif there is an error in the specification of the retrieval cue. , There Ij.re possible ways of recovering from such errors, but they lead' ~9!Ji~,~iI1dof cmnbinatorial explosions which plague this kind of computefiroplerfientMioh, But suppose thatw.~. iJ#~gihe~(':!h~ie~phmemory is represented by a unit which has mutua:IIY~5eicr-ny)intetacfj()nswith units standing for -., " "~"' ";'" ", ' ' ' ' ' , each of its properti~$; 'flie e:Qe:Yeranyprbperty of the memory became active" th~; rotf~tt~p:cit()b~iactivated , and whenever the memorywa.si" ' , McClelland (1981) developed a simulation model that illustrates how a system with these properties would act as a content addressable memory. The model is obviously oversimplified , but it illustrates many of the characteristics of the more complex models that will be considered in later chapters.
Consider the information represented in Figure 10 , of the units needed to represent this information is shown in Figure 11 .
In this network , there is an " instance unit" for each of the characters described in Figure 10 , and that unit is linked by mutually excitatory activation corresponding to Lance. In effect, we have retrieved a representation of Lance. More will happen than just what we have described so far, but for the moment let us stop here.
Of course , sometimes we may wish to retrieve a name , given other information. In this case , we might start with some of Lance properties , effectively asking the system , say " Who do you know who is a Shark and in his 20s?" by activating the Shark and 20s units. In this case it turns out that there is a single individual , Ken , who fits the description. So , when we activate these two properties , we will activate the instance unit for Ken , and this in turn will activate his name unit and fill in his other properties as well.
Graceful degradation.
A few of the desirable properties of this kind of model are visible from considering what happens as we vary the set of features we use to probe the memory in an attempt to retrieve a particular individual's name. Any set of features which is sufficient to uniquely characterize a particular item will activate the instance node for that item . more strongly than any other instance node. A probe which contains misleading features will most strongly activate the node that it matches best. This will clearly be a poorer cue than one which contains no misleading information-but it will still be sufficient to activate the " right answer " more strongly than any other, as long as the introduction qf misleading information does not make the probe closer to some other item. In general , though the degree of activation of a particular instance node and of the corresponding name nodes varies in this model as a function of the exact content of the probe, errors in the probe will not be fatal unless they make the probe point to the wrong memory. This kind of model' s handling of incomplete or partial probes also requires no special error-recovery scheme to work-it is a natural by-product of the nature of the retrieval mechanism that it is capable of graceful degradation.
These aspects of the behavior of the Jets and Sharks model deserve more detailed consideration than the present space allows. One reason we do not go into them is that we view this model as a stepping stone in the development of other models , such as the models using more distributed representations , that occur in other parts of this book. We , however, have more to say about this simple model , for like some of the other models we have already examined, this model exhibits some useful properties which emerge from the interactions of the processing units.
Default assignment.
It probably will have occurred to the reader that in many of the situations we have been examining, there will be other --.J ----.
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activations occurring which may influence the pattern of activation which is retrieved. So, in the case where we retrieved the properties of Lance , those properties , once they become active, can begin to activate the units for other individuals with those same properties. The memory unit for Lance will be in competition with these units and will tend to keep their activation down, but to the extent that they do become active , they will tend to activate their own properties and therefore fill them in. In this way, the model can fill in properties of individuals based on what it knows about other, similar instances.
To illustrate how this might work we have simulated the case in which we do not know that Lance is a Burglar as opposed to a Bookie or a Pusher. It turns out that there are a group of individuals in the set who are very similar to Lance in many respects. When Lance properties become activated, these other units become partially activated, and they start activating their properties. Since they all share the same " occupation " they work together to fill in that property for Lance. Of course , there is no reason why this should necessarily be the right answer, but generally speaking, the more similar two things are in respects that we know about, the more likely they are to be similar in respects that we do not, and the model implements this heuristic.
Spontaneous generalization.
The model we have been describing
has another valuable property as well-it tends to retrieve what is common to those memories which match a retrieval cue which is too general to capture anyone memory. Thus , for example , we could probe the system by activating the unit corresponding to membership in the Jet~. This unit will partially activate all the instances of the Jets thereby causing each to send activations to its properties. In this way the model can retrieve the typical values that the members of the Jets have on each dimension-even though there is no one Jet that has these typical values. In the example, 9 of 15 Jets are single , 9 of 15 are in their 20s , and 9 of 15 have only a Junior High School education; when we probe by activating the Jet unit , all three of these properties dominate. The Jets are evenly divided between the three occupations so each of these units becomes partially activated. Each has a different name , so that each name unit is very weakly activated , nearly cancelling each other out.
In the example just given of spontaneous generalization , it would not be unreasonable to suppose that someone might have explicitly stored a generalization about the members of a gang. The account just given would be an alternative to " explicit storage " of the generalization. It has two advantages , though, over such an account. First , it does not require any special generalization formation mechanism. Second , it can provide us with generalizations on unanticipated lines, on demand. The sort of model we are considering, then, is considerably more than a content addressable memory. In addition , it performs default assignment , and it can spontaneously retrieve a general concept of the individuals that match any specifiable probe. These properties must be explicitly implemented as complicated computational extensions of other models of knowledge retrieval , but in PDP models they are natural by-products of the retrieval process itself.
REPRESENT A TION AND LEARNING IN
PDP
MODELS
In the Jets .and Sharks model , we can speak of the model's active representation at a particular time , and associate this with the pattern of activation over the units in the system. We can also ask: What is the stored knowledge that gives rise to that pattern of activation? In considering this question , we see immediately an important difference between PDP models and other models of cognitive processes. In most models , knowledge is stored as a static copy of a pattern. Retrieval amounts to finding the pattern in long-term memory and copying it into a buffer or working memory. There is no real difference between the stored representation in long-term memory and the active representation in working memory. In PDP models, though , this is not the case.
In these models , the patterns themselves are not stored. Rather, what is stored is the connection strengths between units that allow these patterns to be re-created. In the Jets and Sharks model , there is an instance unit assigned to each individual , but that unit does not contain a copy of the representation of that individual. Instead , it is simply the case that the connections between it and the other units in the system are such that activation of the unit will cause the pattern for the individual to be reinstated on the property units.
This difference between PDP models and conventional models has enormous implications , both for processing and for learning. We have already seen some of the implications for processing. The representation of the knowledge is set up in such a way that the knowledge necessarily influences the course of processing. Using knowledge in processing is no longer a matter of finding the relevant information in memory and bringing it to bear; it is part and parcel of the processing itself.
For learning, the implications are equally profound. For if the knowledge is the strengths of the connections , learning must be a matter of finding the right connection strengths so that the right patterns of activation will be produced under the right circumstances. This is an extremely important property of this class of models , for it opens up the possibility that an information processing mechanism could learn as a result of tuning its connections , to capture the interdependencies between activations that it is exposed to in the course of processing.
In recent years , there has been quite a lot of interest in learning in cognitive science. Computational approaches to learning fall predominantly into what might be called the " explicit rule formulation " tradition , as represented by the work of Winston (1975) , the suggestions of Chomsky, and the ACT'" model of 1. R. Anderson (1983) . All of this work shares the assumption that the goal of learning is to formulate explicit rules (propositions , productions , etc. ) which capture powerful generalizations in a succinct way. Fairly powerful mechanisms, usually with considerable innate knowledge about a domain , and/ or some starting set of primitive propositional representations , then formulate hypothetical general rules, e. , by comparing particular cases and formulating explicit generalizations.
The approach that we take in developing PDP models is completely different. First , we do not assume that the goal of learning is the formulation of explicit rules. Rather, we assume it is the acquisition of connection strengths which allow a network of simple units to act though it knew the rules. Second, we do not attribute powerful computational capabilities to the learning mechanism. Rather, we assume very simple connection strength modulation mechanisms which adjust the strength of connections between units based on information locally available at the connection. These issues will be addressed at length in later sections of this book.
For now, our purpose is to give a simple , illustrative example of the connection strength modulation process , and how it can produce networks which exhibit some interesting behavior.
Local VS. distributed representation.
Before we turn to an explicit consideration of this issue , we raise a basic question about representation. Once we have achieved the insight that the knowledge is stored in the strengths of the interconnections between units, a question arises. Is there any reason to assign one unit to each pattern that we wish to learn? Another possibility-one that we explore extensively in this book-is the possibility that the knowledge about any individual pattern is not stored in the connections of a special unit reserved for that pattern , but is distributed over the connections among a large number of processing units. On this view, the Jets and Sharks model represents a special case in which separate units are reserved for each instance.
Models in which connection information is explicitly thought of as distributed have been proposed by a number of investigators. The units in these collections may themselves correspond to conceptual primitives , or they may have no particular meaning as individuals. In either case , the focus shifts to patterns of activation over these units and to mechanisms whose explicit purpose is to learn the right connection strengths to allow the right patterns of activation to become activated under the right circumstances.
In the rest of this section , we will give a simple example of a POP model in which the knowledge is distributed. We will first explain how the model would work, given pre-existing connections, and we will then describe how it could come to acquire the right connection strengths We will consider a simple version of a common , type of distributed model, a pattern associator.
--.. -.. ----Pattern associators are models in which a pattern of activation over one set of units can cause a pattern of activation over another set of units without any intervening units to stand for either pattern as a whole. Pattern associators would, for example, be capable of associating a pattern of activation on one set of units corresponding to the appearance of an object with a pattern on another set corresponding to the aroma of the object , so that , when an object is presented visually, causing its visual pattern to become active , the model produces the pattern corresponding to its aroma.
How a pattern associator works.
For purposes of illustration, we present a very simple pattern associator in Figure 12 . In this model there are four units in each of two pools. The first pool , the A units will be the pool in which patterns corresponding to the sight of various objects might be represented. The second pool , the Bunits, will be the pool in which the pattern corresponding to the aroma will be represented. We can pretend that alternative patterns of activation on excited (activation greater than 0), it will excite the B unit. For this example , we ll simply assume that the activation of each unit is set to the sum of the excitatory and inhibitory effects operating on it. This is one of the simplest possible cases.
Suppose, now , that we have created on the A units the pattern corresponding to the first visual pattern shown in Figure 13 , the rose. How should we arrange the strengths of the interconnections between the A units and the B units to reproduce the pattern corresponding to the aroma of a rose? We simply need to arrange for each A unit to tend to excite each B unit which has a positive activation in the aroma pattern and to inhibit each B unit which has a negative activation in the aroma pattern. It turns out that this goal is achieved by setting the strength of the connection between a given A unit and a given B unit to a value proportional to the product of the activation of the two units.
In Figure 12 , the weights on the connections were chosen to allow the A pattern illustrated there to produce the illustrated B pattern according to this principle. The actual strengths of the connections were set to :t .
, rather than :t 1 , so that the A pattern will produce the right magnitude, as well as the right sign , for the activations of the units in the B pattern. The same connections are reproduced in matrix form in Figure 13A. Pattern associators like the one in Figure 12 have a number of nice properties. One is that they do not require a perfect copy of the input to produce the correct output , though its strength will be weaker in this case. For example, suppose that the associ at or shown in Figure 12 were presented with an A pattern of 0, 1). This is the A pattern shown in the figure , with the activation of one of its elements set to O. The B pattern produced in response will have the activations of all of the B units in the right direction; however, they will be somewhat weaker than they would be , had the complete A pattern been shown. Similar How a pattern associator learns.
So far, we have seen how we as model builders can construct the right set of weights to allow one pattern to cause another. The interesting thing, though, is that we do not need to build these interconnection strengths in by hand. Instead, the pattern associator can teach itself the right set of interconnections through experience processing the patterns in conjunction with each other.
A number of different rules for adjusting connection strengths have been proposed. One of the first-and definitely the best known-is due A natural extension of this rule to cover the positive and negative activation values allowed in our example is:
Adjust the strength of the connection between units A and B in proportion to the product of their simultaneous activation.
In this formulation , if the product is positive , the change makes the connection more excitatory, and if the product is negative , the change makes the connection more inhibitory. For simplicity of reference , we will call this the Hebb rule although it is not exactly Hebb' s original formulation.
With this simple learning rule, we could train a " blank copy " of the pattern associator shown in Figure 12 to produce the B pattern for rose when the A pattern is shown, simply by presenting the A and B patterns together and modulating the connection strengths according to thH ebb rule. The size of the change made on every trial would, of course , be a parameter. We generally assume that the changes made on each instance are rather small , and that connection strengths build up gradually. The values shown in Figure 13A , then , would be acquired as a result of a number of experiences with the A and B pattern pair.
It is very important to note that the information needed to use the Hebb rule to determine the value each connection should have is locally available at the connection. All a given connection needs to consider is the activation of the units on both sides of it. Thus, it would be possible to actually implement such a connection modulation scheme locally, in each connection , without requiring any prognimmer to reach into each connection and set it to just the right value.
It turns out that the Hebb rule as stated here has some serious limitations , and, to our knowledge , no theorists continue to use it in this simple form. More sophisticated connection modulation schemes have been proposed by other workers; most important among these are the delta rule , discussed extensively in Chapter1J.l; the competitive learning rule, discussed in Chapter 5; and the joint I'fu Dabili't y rul~for learning in stochastic parallel models, described in the Chapter /\ All of these learning rules have the property that they adjust the strengths of connections between units on the basis of information that can be assumed to be locally available to the unit. Learning, then , in all of these cases amounts to a. very simple process that can be implemented locally at each connection without the need for any overall supervision. Thus models which 'incorporate these learning rules train themselves to have the right interconnections in the course of processing the members of an ensemble of patterns.
Learning multiple patterns in the same set of interconnections. to now, we have considered how we might teach our pattern associator to associate the visual pattern for one object with a pattern for the aroma of the same object. Obviously, different patterns of interconnections between the A and B units are appropriate for causing the visual pattern for a different object to give rise to the pattern for its aroma.
The same principles apply, however, and if we presented our pattern associator with the A and B patterns for steak, it would learn the right set of interconnections for that case instead (these are shown in Figure   13B ). In fact, it turns out that we can actually teach the same pattern associ at or a number of different associations. The matrix representing the set of interconnections that would be learned if we taught the same pattern associator both the rose association and the steak association shown in Figure 14 . The reader can verify this by adding the two matrices for the individual patterns together. The reader can also verify that this set of connections will allow the rose A pattern to produce the rose B pattern, and the steak A pattern to produce the steak B pattern:
when either input pattern is presented, the correct corresponding output is produced.
The examples used here have the property that the two different visual patterns are completely uncorrelated with each other. This being S5 f!/-e--.-aA 1-.
--++ ++ --FIGURE 14. The weights in the third matrix allow either A pattern shown in Figure 0 to recreate the corresponding B pattern. Each weight in this case is equal to the sum of the weight for the A pattern and the weight for the B pattern, as illustrated.
the case , the rose pattern produces no effect when the interconnections for the steak have been established, and the steak pattern produces no effect when the interconnections for the rose association are in effect.
For this reason , it is possible to add together the pattern of interconnections for the rose association and the pattern for the steak association , and still be able to associate the sight of the steak with the smell of a steak and the sight of a rose with the smell of a rose. The two sets of interconnections do not interact at all.
One of the limitations of the Hebbian learning rule is that it can learn the connection strengths appropriate to an entire ensemble of patterns only when all the patterns are completely uncorrelated. This restriction does not, however, apply to pattern associators which use more sophisticated learning schemes.
Attractive properties of pattern associator models.
Pattern associator models have the property that uncorrelated patterns do not interact with each other, but more similar ones do. Thus , to the extent that a new pattern of activation on the A units is similar to one of the old ones , it will tend to have similar effects. Furthermore, if we assume that learning the interconnections occurs in small increments , similar patterns will essentially reinforce the strengths of the links they share in common with other patterns. Thus, if we present the same pair of patterns over and over, but each time we add a little random noise to each element of each member of the pair, the system will automatically learn to associate the central tendency of the . two patterns and will learn to ignore the noise. . What will be stored will be an average of the similar patterns with the slight variations removed. On the other hand, when we present the system with completely uncorrelated patterns, they will not interact with each other in this way. Thus , the same pool of units can extract the central tendency of each of a number of pairs of unrelated patterns. This aspect of distributed models is exploited extensively in Chapters 17 and. 25 on distributed memory and amnesia.
THE APPEAL OF POP
Extracting the structure of an ensemble of patterns.
The fact that similar patterns tend to produce similar effects allows distributed models to exhibit a kind of spontaneous generalization , extending behavior appropriate for one pattern to other similar patterns. This property is shared by other PDP models , such as the word perception model and the Jets and Sharks model described above; the main difference here is in the existence of simple, local , learning mechanisms that can allow the acquisition of the connection strengths needed to produce these generalizations through experience with members of the ensemble of patterns. Distributed models have another interesting property as well: If there are regularities in the correspondences between pairs of patterns , the model will naturally extract these regularities. This property allows distributed models to acquire patterns of interconnections that lead them to behave in ways we ordinarily take as evidence for the use of linguistic rules.
detailed example of such a model is described in Chapter 18. Here , we describe the model very briefly. The model is a mechanism that learns hqw to construct the past tenses of words from their root forms through repeated presentations of examples of root forms paired with the corresponding past-tense form. The model consists of two pools of units. In one pool , patterns of activation representing the phonological structure of the root form of the verb can be represented and, in the other, patterns representing the phonological structure of the past tense can be represented. The goal of the model is simply to learn the right connection strengths between the root units and the past-tense units , so that whenever the root form of a verb is presented the model will construct the corresponding past-tense form. The model is trained by presenting the root form of the verb as a pattern of activation over the root units , and then using a simple , local , learning rule to adjust the connection strengths so that this root form will tend to produce the correct pattern of activation over the past-tense units. The model is tested by simply presenting the root form as a pattern of activation over the root units and examining the pattern of activation produced over the past-tense units.
The model is trained initially with a small number of verbs children learn early in the acquisition process. At this point in learning, it can only produce appropriate outputs for inputs that it has explicitly been shown. But as it learns more and more verbs , it exhibits two interest"-ing behaviors. First, it produces the standard ed past tense when tested with pseudo-verbs or verbs it has never seen. Second, it " overregularizes " the past tense of irregular words it previously completed correctly. Often, the model will blend the irregular past tense of the word with the regular ed ending, and produce errors like CAMED as the past of --.J THE POP PERSPECfIVE COME.
These phenomena mirror those observed in the early phases of acquisition of control over past tenses in young children.
The generativity of the child' s responses-the creation of regular past tenses of new verbs and the overregularization of the irregular verbs-has been taken as strong evidence that the child has induced the rule which states that the regular correspondence for the past tense
English is to add a final ed (Berko , 1958) . On the evidence of its performance , then , the model can be said to have acquired the rule. However, no special rule-induction mechanism is used, and no special language-acquisition device is required. The model learns to behave in accordance with the rule , not by explicitly noting that most words take ed in the past tense in English and storing this rule away explicitly, but simply by building up a set of connections in a pattern associator through a long series of simple learning experiences. The same mechanisms of parallel distributed processing and connection modification which are used in a number of domains serve, in this case, to produce implicit knowledge tantamount to a linguistic rule. The model also provides' a fairly detailed account of a number of the specific aspects of the .error patterns children make in learning the rule. In this sense , it provides a richer and more detailed description of the acquisition process than any that falls out naturally from the assumption that the child is building up a repertoire of explicit but inaccessible rules.
There is a lot more to be said about distributed models of learning, about their strengths and their weaknesses , than we have space for in this preliminary consideration. For now we hope mainly to have suggested that they provide dramatically different accounts of learning and acquisition than are offered by traditional models of these processes. We saw in earlier sections of this chapter that performance in accordance with rules can emerge from the interactions of simple, interconnected units. Now we can see how the aquisition of performance that conforms to linguistic rules can emerge from a simple, local , connection strength modulation process.
We have seen what the properties of PDP models are in informal terms , and we have seen how these properties operate to make the models do many of the kinds of things that they do. The business of the next chapter is to lay out these properties more formally, and to introduce some formal tools for their description and analysis. Before we turn to this, however . we wish to describe some of the major sources of inspiration for the PDP approach.
-.J
THE APPEAL OF POP ORIGINS OF PARALLEL DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING
The ideas behind the PDP approach have a history that stretches back indefinitely. In this section , we mention briefly some of the people who have thought in these terms , particularly those whose work has had an impact on our own thinking. This section should not been seen as an authoritative review of the history, but only as a description of our own sources of inspiration.
Some of the earliest roots of the PDP approach can be found in the work of the unique neurologists, Jackson (1869 Jackson ( /1958 and Luria (1966) . Jackson was a forceful and persuasive critic of the simplistic localizationist doctrines of late nineteenth century neurology, and he argued convincingly for distributed , multilevel conceptions of processing systems. Luria, the Russian psychologist and neurologist , put forward the notion of the dynamic functional system.
On this view, every behavioral or cognitive process resulted from the coordination of a large number of different components , each roughly localized in different regions of the brain , but all working together in dynamic interaction.
Neither Hughlings-Jackson nor Luria is noted for the clarity of his views , but we have seen in their ideas a rough characterization of the kind of parallel distributed processing system we envision.
Two other contributors to the deep background of PDP were Hebb (1949) and Lashley (1950) . We already have noted Hebb' s contribution of the Hebb rule of synaptic modification; he also introduced the concept of cell assemblies-a concrete example of a limited form of distributed processing-and discussed the idea of reverberation of activation within neural networks. Hebb' s ideas were cast more in the form of speculations about neural functioning than in the form of concrete processing models, but his thinking captures some of the flavor of parallel distributed processing mechanisms. Lashley s contribution was to insist upon the idea of distributed representation. Lashley may have been too radical and too vague, and his doctrine of equipotentiality of broad regions of cortex clearly overstated the case. Yet many of his insights into the difficulties of storing the " engram " locally in the brain are telling, and he seemed to capture quite precisely the essence of distributed representation in insisting that" there are no special cells reserved for special memories " (Lashley, 1950 , p. 500).
In the 1950s , there were two major figures whose ideas have contributed to the development of our approach. One was Rosenblatt (1959 Rosenblatt ( , 1962 and the other was Selfridge (1955) . In his Principles of Neurodynamics (I 962), Rosenblatt articulated clearly the promise of a neurally inspired approach to computation , and he developed the perceptron convergence procedure an important advance over the Hebb rule for ..J THE POP PERSPECTIVE changing synaptic connections. Rosenblatt s work was very controversial at the time , and the specific models he proposed were not up to all the hopes he had for them. But his vision of the human information processing system as a dynamic, interactive , self-organizing system lies at the core of the PDP approach. Selfridge s contribution was his insistence on the importance of interactive processing, and the development of Pandemonium an explicitly computational example of a dynamic , interactive mechanism applied to computational problems in perception.
In the late 60s and early 70s , serial processing and the von Neumann computer dominated both psychology and artificial intelligence , but there were a number of researchers who proposed neural mechanisms which capture much of the flavor of PDP models. Among these figures , the most influential in our work have been 1. A. Anderson Grossberg, and Longuet-Higgins. Grossberg s mathematical analysis of the properties of neural networks led him to many insights we have only come to appreciate through extensive experience with computer simulation , and he deserves credit for seeing the relevance of neurally inspired mechanisms in many areas of perception and memory well before the field was ready for these kinds of ideas (Grossberg, 1978) . Grossberg (1976) Willshaw, a member of the Edinburgh group, provided some very elegant mathematical analyses of the properties of various distributed representation schemes (Willshaw, 1981) . His insights provide one of the sources of the idea of coarse coding described at length in Chapter 3. Many of the contributions of Anderson , Willshaw , and others distributed modelers may be found in Hinton and Anderson (1981) . Others who have made important contributions to learning in POP models include Amari (1977a), Bienenstock , Cooper, and Munro (1982 ( ), Fukushima (1975 , Kohonen (1977 Kohonen ( , 1984 , and von der Malsburg (1973) .
Toward the middle of the 1970s, the idea of parallel processing began to have something of a renaissance in computational circles. and stressed the biological implausibility of most of the prevailing computational models in artificial intelligence. Hofstadter (1979 Hofstadter ( , 1985 deserves credit for stressing the existence of subcognitive-what we call microstructural-level , and pointing out how important it can be to delve into the microstructure to gain insight. A sand dune , he has said is not a grain of sand. Others have contributed crucial technical insights. Sutton and Barto (1981) provided an insightful analysis of the connection modification scheme we call the delta rule and illustrated the power of the rule to account for some of the subtler properties of classical conditioning. And Hopfield' s (1982) contribution of the idea that network models can be seen as seeking minima in energy landscapes played a prominent role in the development of the Boltzmann machine (Chapter 7), and in the crystallization of the ideas presented in Chapters 7 and 14 on. harmony theory and schemata.
The power of parallel distributed processing is becoming more and more apparent , and many others have recently joined in the exploration of the capabilities of these mechanisms. We hope this book represents the nature of the enterprise we are all involved in , and that it does justice to the potential of the PDP approach.
